DESPERATE MEASURES

Desperate people often take desperate measures. Desperate measures may ameliorate situations or could worsen matters depending on the circumstances leading to or culminating in the desperation. 

Carefully planned, thought through and well executed desperate measures may turn things around for the better depending on the macro political, social, public and economic environment, especially if it is an election year. 

There is no doubt that the leader of our community is a desperate man. He is desperately yearning for another four – year mandate so that he could still be the head of state head, of government and the Commander – In – Chief of the Republic of Ghana and the Armed Forces of Ghana.

The leader of our community has been a failure as far as our community is concerned and as far as the entire nation is concerned. What has our community achieved during his eight – year presidency? Has the leader improved the service conditions of members of our community? 

Perhaps he is deceiving himself with the “nominal gains” but not the real improvement of our community, the well – being of the members, the operational and administrative capabilities of the troops.

What about the level of esprit de Corps, sense of camaraderie and team work in the Armed Forces? The answers to these few questions are not for fetched.

The first indicator of the “failure” of our leader is the Embraer aircraft bought from Brazil for our Airforce. Instead of going for the state of the art Airbus at a really very competitive price, then vice leader of our community and chairman of our council decided to go in for a “cheap” aircraft which turned out to be very expensive-more expensive than the Airbus in competitive and operational terms. The opportunity cost of that aircraft (Brazilian Embraer) was and is enormous. 

The Ghana Armed Forces and the nation lost a lot by way of other equipment and logistics that could have been provided for by the extra funds used in paying for a poor quality aircraft. A report prepared by the Ghana Airforce Team of Pilots/Experts placed the Airbus-combined European and American technology- far ahead of several other aircrafts including the Embraer. 

Some of the criteria used to make the comparative analyses beyond reproach were operational capability, durability, efficiency, fuel efficiency and serviceability. It was therefore surprising that the Ghana Airforce Team of Pilots/Experts report was abandoned and the cheap Brazilian aircraft was bought with our hard earned cash.

With the likes of my friend, General SK Adeti, around to ensure an underserved electoral victory for the overall leader of our community, the plan and grounds are set to use the security service to have “JM” declared winner of the 2016 Presidential elections. 

The government had appointed Mr. Kudalor as the Acting IGP before the end of 2015 as a first major step of taking absolute control of our community. The appointment of Mr. Kudalor as IGP had been a reward for his brutalities and no – nonsense posture on innocent “Let My Vote Count” and “Alliance for Accountable Government” (AFAG) demonstrations. 

Our leader is trying to “repair” his dented image in the eyes of the military. Even though Article 57 of our 1992 Constitution makes him the Commander-In-Chief of our community, the leader of our community is suffering from an identity and recognition syndrome and is desperately seeking to be identified with the Armed Forces.

Consequently, in recent times, our leader has chosen to wear military uniforms during military ceremonies. The first time our leader wore a military uniform as the President of the Republic of Ghana was during the commissioning of an edifice for the Ghana Navy in Burma Camp. He wore a military camouflage dress. The second time he wore it was on 16 September 2016, on the occasion of the graduation of officer Cadets of Regular Career Course 56 and Short Service /Special Duties Course 54.

On that occasion, our leader wore the Army Ceremonial Dress for Generals. He was splendid in the uniform!

It is on record that General JD Mahama started wearing military uniforms during the regimes of Jerry Rawlings when he ordered that his secretaries or ministers of state be given military training. Several political appointees wore military uniforms at MATS and elsewhere, undertook some basic military training including field craft and Skill At Arms (Weapons Training)

At that time, Secretary/Minister JD Mahama was obeying orders of the then Commander-In-Chief who fortunately was a military officer and was not strange to military uniforms and environment. 

Indeed, Jerry Rawlings wore uniforms of all the Arms of the Ghana Armed Forces. He chose to wear the Army and Naval uniforms in addition to his favorite Airforce uniforms. The occasion determined the uniform that Jerry Rawlings wore. For instance at a purely Army programme, he wore the Army uniform and at a purely Naval programme, he wore the naval uniform. For national or tri-service programmes, Jerry Rawlings wore his Airforce uniforms appropriately. 

The case of “General” JD Mahama is one of the numerous cases of “causing financial loss” to the state. 

Readers and members of our community may be wondering why this “charge” or “offence” of causing financial loss to the state. The reason is simple. The full regalia for the head of state to dress in a military ceremonial dress- Army ceremonial dress- is quite expensive. It could cost close to over three thousand pound sterling. The cost of the items is quite high taking our current economic challenges into account. The cost of the cup, top dress, trousers, shoes, epaulettes, sword, belt, and others would run into several thousands of the British pound sterling. An amount of three thousand pound sterling is being modest. 

May the Director of Ordnance Services tell the members of our community how much it cost the Ghana Armed Forces and the state to kit “General” JD Mahama on Friday 16 September 2016?

What about the first outfit worn during the commissioning of the naval edifice? 

Information I have indicates that the other two Services are competing with the Army to kit our leader so that he could dress in their uniforms also for “image building”. 

If the information is true, is it not a reckless dissipation of our scarce resources?

Certainly, the Navy and the Airforce would not want to be left out of this reckless competition and have ordered kits for our leader. Could it not have been better to use the resources spent on General” JD Mahama to kit at least one of the three Service Commanders or one of the three Commandants of our training institutions where regularly ceremonies take place and the Commandants are to dress appropriately?

We hope that readers and members of our community would not describe us as being petty or mean. A prudent decision is taken against the background of prevailing circumstances. 

Currently, Ghana is a heavily indebted poor country whether so declared or not! If it were not so, how come Ghana is pursuing an austerity regime under the auspices of the international Monitory Fund (IMF)? 

It is only countries with serious economic challenges (crises) that submit themselves to the regimes of the IMF. 

Already, there are reports, and that has been admitted by the Minister for Finance, that the government is facing serious difficulties in paying salaries of workers. Under those circumstances, any reckless dissipation of funds is to be avoided. Any country facing serious economic challenges or crises must weigh its choices very well.

Again, basic economics teaches us to have a prudent scale of preference to enable us make very useful and vital choices whose opportunity costs are less disastrous. We therefore beg to say that the decision by the Commander-In-Chief and the Military High Command to kit “General” JD Mahama was ill - advised and unhelpful. 

The second major desperate measure of our leader is the haphazard, erratic and uncoordinated manner in which he has been increasing salaries and allowances of members of the Ghana Armed Forces and the civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence or the Ghana Armed Forces. Is it not shameful that on August 11 2016, the leader of our community increased the earned dollar allowance for peacekeeping by just one dollar per diem and justified it with a press release by my Nyebro friend, Colonel Aggrey Quashie, Director Public Relations of the Ghana Armed Forces?  

Was it not more shameful and a real case of desperation when a few days later, our leader thought it wiser to increase the earned dollar by a further four dollars thereby bringing the total to five dollars?

Does it suggest that the leader had not planned to do anything about the earned dollar allowance but was forced beyond his control to do so or because the Daily Statesman claims the opposition New Patriotic Party had captured it in its yet to be released manifesto?

If I may ask ooooo…..why did it take our leader five years and I repeat five years to increase the UN peacekeeping allowance for formed troops (earned dollar allowance) by just one dollar?

If he had been more prudent, he would have taken a cue from his immediate predecessor- John Mills and JA Kufour-and would have realized that as soon as he became the President and Commander-In-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces, he ought to have done something about it.

For instance as soon as JA Kufuor became the President and C-I-C of Ghana on 7 January 2001, he increased the earned dollar in March 2001 from fourteen dollars to twenty dollars. Again, during the second mandate of JA Kufuor, he increased the earned dollar from twenty to twenty-five dollars in 2005. 

Furthermore, JA Kufuor increased the earned dollar from twenty-five to twenty-seven dollars in 2008 before he completed his mandate on 6 January 2009. But fact is, his party was out and we did not even vote for them.

Enter John Mills in 2009 and he also increased the earned dollar from twenty-seven dollars to thirty dollars in 2009 (thus the very first year of his Presidency). Taking a cue from these two examples, what prevented General JD Mahama from increasing the earned dollar in 2013 at most after the Supreme Court ruling in his favour? 

It shows that General Mahama did not mean well for the troops but realized that the 2016 elections were critical and needed to bolster his sinking reputation in the eyes of the military.

What is this nonsense of first class military personnel?

I hear the military personnel closely associated with the Presidency and or the Executive are treated as first class military personnel while all the others are treated as second class military personnel. 

This practice started during the era of the Forces Reserve Battalion (FRB) and now the 64 Infantry Regiment (6 for June and 4 for 4^th June 1979 uprising of the AFRC considered  as the forerunner of the PNDC and NDC).

With Lt. Col Quashie (a Nyebro) as one of the pioneering Commanding Officers, the FRB was used to provide comfort and succor to the selected favorite ones to the exclusion of the general members of the community.

These “most favoured” officers and men could undertake all kinds of overt and covert operations with impunity. Some specially selected police personnel were made part of this arrangement. 

The situation persisted when the name was changed from Forces Reserved Battalion to 64 Infantry Regiment. Members of the “Special Regiment” received special treatment. They had and still have their separate training grounds at Asutsuare with superior training facilities which are lacking at Army Recruit School (ARTS) at Shai Hills, Naval Training Schools at Tema and Sekondi and Airforce Training School at Takoradi.

The 64 Infantry Regiment has different Unit Equipment Table (UET), separate and distinct from those of the Army Battalions in Tema, Takoradi, Sunyani, Kumasi, Burma Camp and Tamale. The personnel of the regular battalions detest this arrangement but feel helpless about it as the Military High Command is scared to talk about it let alone to suggest that the incongruous situation be changed.

Special packages are given to personnel of this unit in addition to the general service conditions by way of housing, pay and allowances. Promotion of personnel and selection for peace support operations are made to favour them. 

Some of these personnel accompany the Presidency on internal and external trips with associated travelling allowances. Some are also selected for anti-hijacking and anti-terrorist operations on aircrafts with attendant juicy packages. All these special packages and allocation of vehicles (new and confiscated ones at the seaports) go to enhance the standard of living of the personnel of 64 Infantry Regiment to the chagrin of professionally equally competent regular members of the Armed Forces.

The recent creation of Special Forces in the three Services is only a farce. Real power still resides in the 64 Infantry Regiment which is able to act in some circumstances directly under the command and control of the Presidency before even the Chief of Army Staff may be aware. What an arrangement!!!

Theoretically or on paper, the 64 Infantry Regiment is under the operational and administrative control of the Army Headquarters but in practice, it is under the effective control of the political leadership and therefore I’m not shocked when some members of community went to Kasoa to hurt innocent Ghanaians.

A leader is not simply a professional killer or a manager of violence. He is rather a protector of ideals of the nation, ready to sacrifice his life defending and fighting for the sovereign rights of his nation so that others can live in a free and just society. We should therefore rise up to our responsibilities as officers and men and leave politics to the politicians

Ghana Military Academy To Be Moved?

Probably, the biggest problem Ghana Military Academy (GMA) suffers from is its co-location with MATS at Teshie. Organizationally, GMA is one of the thirteen training institutions that come under the Commandants of MATS.

GMA therefore does not enjoy the independence or autonomy that other military academies enjoy. To give a few examples, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, the India Military Academy, Dehra Dun, India and the National Defence Academy (NDA) Nigeria are all autonomous schools commanded by Major Generals. In all respect therefore, particularly in the area of finance, the Commandant is the sole authority.

IN GMA, HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT THE CASE. INDEED, AS HAS BEEN STATED EARLIER, SOME COMMANDANTS OF MATS SEE GMA AS A UNIT UNDER THEM AND TRY UNDULY TO INTERFERE WITH GMA’S ACTIVITIES PARTICULARLY WITH THE ACADEMY BUDGET. THIS HAS OFTEN LED TO CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMANDANTS MATS AND COS GMA.

The solution to this age-old problem is to change the present organization and move GMA away from its present location to a site where it will be completely autonomous as is the case in the examples given. Sandhurst, Dehra Dun and NDA are all commanded by Major Generals.

FURTHERMORE, THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT THAT HAS GMA AS A UNIT UNDER MATS FORMATION AND THEREFORE MAKES BASIC DEMANDS LIKE ROUTINE LETTERS TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS BEING ROUTED THROUGH MATS HQ HAS PROVED ANACHRONISTIC.

Double handling and resultant time wastage aside, this arrangement demeans the status of GMA as the only institution responsible for producing officers for the Ghana Armed Forces.

GMA MUST BE AN AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTION WITH ITS OWN BUDGET AND A COMMANDANT WHO REPORTS DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF IN CONSONANCE WITH THE TRI-SERVICE NATURE OF THE INSTITUTION. THIS SITUATION MAY BE LIKENED TO WHAT HAPPENS AT THE GHANA ARMED FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE WHERE THE COMMANDANT DEALS DIRECTLY WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF. WITH ALL THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND REPUTATION GMA HAS, WHAT IS WRONG WITH HAVING AT LEAST A BRIGADIER AS THE HEAD?

 

Again, to bring it in line with convention in military academies modeled on Sandhurst lines, the present title of the head as Commanding Officer of the Ghana Military Academy must reviewed and possibly changed to the Commandant of the Ghana Military Academy.

Another reason for advocating GMA’s movement from the present location is that, when it was established in the 1960s, there were no nearby settlements which interfered with training.

To the north of GMA, there was an open stretch of savannah grassland of over ten kiloimetres to Madina. Eastwards, there was an equally long stretch of land to Ashaiman. Today, all these areas are fully built up with GMA hemmed in.

The result is that there is no local training area to practice basic drills taught in the classroom as was the case in my days as a cadet in the early 1970s. The logistic strain of constantly moving cadets out of GMA to practice basic field drills can be imagined

.

A pertinent question which arises immediately is, where can GMA be moved to, considering the serious financial implications this will entail? 

Providence appears to have given an ideal location for GMA’s future relocation. Just an hour’s drive north-east of Teshie is the Asutware Camp.

This old camp occupies the northern part of the Shai Hills which is itself part of the Bundase training area.

With only a little bit of modification, the Asutware Camp can be developed into an ideal place for the GMA.

It is only an hour’s drive from Accra but sufficiently far to keep cadets and instructors alike from any distractions.

Once the problem of relocation has been solved, the next issue will be that of instructors and their stability in GMA. Because of Ghana’s unique role in international peacekeeping operations, instructors in GMA often have to break their tour to contribute towards such operations. Added to this is the sometimes erratic bulk posting of instructors out of GMA at the same time. When this happens, experience built over time is suddenly lost.

A possible solution to this problem could be the posting of officers to GMA for a fixed period of between two and three years during which there should be no break in service for any course or operation. Once the instructor finishes his tour, he could then be recompensed for his sacrifice with an overseas course and a long tour of duty on a UN peacekeeping mission.

Again, periodic visits by GMA instructors to foreign military academies and training institutions will give the instructor greater exposure and by implication a better output from him.

Similarly, foreign instructors could be invited on a reciprocal basis to share their experiences with GMA instructors. This way, instructors will show more commitment and dedication knowing that they would have nothing to lose while teaching in GMA.

Additionally, the point has been made that for very obvious reasons the instructor in GMA deserves some allowance. The GMA instructor routinely travels away from home and family on exercises. The emotional as well as the physical demands exacted on him cannot be overemphasized.

In the mosquito endemic zone we find ourselves in, malaria naturally takes its toll on the instructor. By the very nature of the job, the GMA instructor has to make several out of hours trips to GMA using his own car and well turned out in mufti at all times. All this impinges on the finances of the GMA instructor.

Currently, between the two regular courses and the one SSC/SD course, GMA takes a maximum of about one hundred cadets. This limitation is imposed by classrooms and accommodation. Once GMA moves into a location with bigger facilities, the intake of cadets can be increased to improve on the current average of sixty cadets commissioned every year, which appears to be on the low side, especially with the very high attrition rate particularly of young officers. 

The next issue to be looked at is that of the minimum entry requirements for the regular cadet. After being pegged at the General Certificate of Education Advance Level since the 1970s, the minimum entry requirement was lowered to the Senior Secondary School Certificate of Education in 1998.

In the rapidly changing, technologically advanced world of the twenty-first century, where frontiers of human knowledge are being pushed further with higher and better education, it is simply inappropriate to go in the opposite direction by reducing educational standards for future officers of the Ghana Armed Forces.

I have stated earlier on in this book that, rather sadly, interest in GMA by the staff appears to be only once a year and that is during graduation in August. This national function which has the parade reviewed by the head of state is the only occasion that staff officers from the service headquarters visit GMA.

Incidentally, and maybe rather unfortunately, the parade more or less serves as the yardstick for judging GMA’s performance over the year. Whatever difficulties the academy encountered during the year does not appear to matter once the parade is very successful.

GMA is a tri-service institution and it is highly recommended that staff officers from Army, Navy and Airforce Headquarters take more interest in GMA activities.

Again, alumni of GMA do not associate with GMA in any way. So far, only the members of Regular Intake 20 have been kind enough to support GMA. The group provided 4 lecterns: one each for the officer Cadet’s Mess and the rooms of the courses.

This has been a laudable gesture and I hope that many more intakes would begin to associate with the Academy in various ways. Alas, intakes senior or junior to these pacesetters have not followed in the good example.

The relationship between alumni of GMA and the Academy is an important one. Apart from the material support ensures that facilities are adequate, the moral support to the instructors and cadets is immense. Many more of these alumni have good ideas for the development of the GMA and our officer crop. Such associations and interactions will help us tap these plans for the general good of GAF.

Again, in recent times, a trend has emerged towards separate commissions and graduation parade by individual service. The Ghana Military Academy is a tri-service institution and the only one responsible for the training of cadets for commission into the Ghana Armed Forces. 

In August 2001, for example, fifty cadets were commissioned at GMA, Teshie. Then two months later in October 2001, nine naval cadets were commissioned at Sekondi. Finally, two months later again in December 2001, nine airforce cadets were commissioned in Takoradi. The question is if GMA is a tri-service institution and the only one charged with the responsibility of training cadets, why did we have three commissions in a space of only five months between August and December 2001 for a total of less than eighty cadets?

What justification was there for expending all the time, energy and meager resources available on three specific graduations at a time when Ghana had declared itself a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)?

It is strongly recommended that graduation must be held once a year for all graduating cadets at the Ghana Military Academy, possibly in August as has been the case for some time now. Piecemeal graduations as are becoming the vogue now only fritter away limited resources.

Finally, GMA which started in 1960 out of the ashes of the 1953-bron Regular Officers Special Training School has trained over three thousand cadets into commissioned officers not only for the Ghana Armed Forces but also for sister African countries like Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Uganda.

Without doubt, GMA has maintained a very high standard as an institution of excellence for cadet training comparable with any in the developed world. What problems I have identified and discussed are purely institutional and human problems one expects in any human institution.

The recommendations made therefore are just aimed at improving on GMA’s already high standards in our quest to maintain and possibly improve it as a center of excellence for cadet training.

It is my fervent hope that, once these problems are resolved, GMA will continue to grow from strength to strength as it continues to provide highly motivated educated leaders of character imbued with the academy’s motto of SERVICE, DEVOTION and SACRIFICE to serve mother Ghana, or indeed any sister African country they may  come from.

It is my hope that, with such disciplined and educated officers of character who understand and acknowledge the supremacy of the constitution at the helm of affairs, the Ghana Armed Forces and others in Africa will develop the cordiality and mutual respect with our civilian kith and kin.

In this way, the necessary enabling environment will be provided for governments to focus on national development to propel us forward. 

Culled from LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGES OF COMMAND by Brigadier General Daniel Kwadjo Frimpong (page 126 titled THE FUTURE)

Ethnocentricism In Our Community

Recent promotions and appointments in the Ghana Armed Forces in particular and other security services in general continue to confirm that the Symbiotic Partnership of Ewes and Northerners (SPEN) have taken over.

Consequently, a lion’s share of all appointments and promotions, especially the strategic and tactical ones have been given to them. That explains why Major General Sampson Adeti (my friend) is parading round like the de facto Chief of Defence Staff. As a matter of fact, he is the most powerful military officer in the Ghana Armed Forces today usurping the powers of the Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Most seasoned military officers and military analysts have likened him to General Arnold Quainoo- the Buffalo Soldier. These experts say that my friend is behaving in much the same way as General Quainoo when he was the Force Commander of the Ghana Armed Forces thereby combining the positions of Army Commander and Chief of Defence Staff effectively.

In the days of General Quainoo, the other Service Commanders were cowed into submission and thus enabling General Quainoo to have a field day to run the affairs of the Ghana Armed Forces as he wished.

In those days, General Quainoo was a member of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and thus a politician as well. General Quainoo was part of the two major Arms of Government, the Executive and the legislature as the PNDC had both – Executive and legislative powers of Ghana vested in it by virtue of the PNDC Establishment and Proclamation laws which suspended the Third Republican Constitution of 1979 and the government of Dr. Hilla Limann.

IN THE SCHEME OF AFFAIRS TODAY, MY FRIEND HAS REPLACED GENERAL QUAINOO. HE IS THE MAN TO BE FEARED BOTH IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS. AS A MEMBER OF THE NDC, MY FRIEND FEARS NOBODY AND HAS MILITARY AND EXECUTIVE POWERS. HE IS SAID TO BE BEST BET OF PRESIDENT RAWLINGS AND SOME MINISTERS WHO RELY ON HIM FOR LAND-GUARD DUTIES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ON LANDS FOR ILLEGAL MINING AND EVEN PROTECTION AT PLUSH ESTATES IN THE CAPITAL.

No appointment or promotion can be made in the Ghana Armed Forces without his input, consent and/or approval. He is currently fine-tuning all the strategic and tactical appointments in the Ghana Armed Forces to ensure victory for our leader in the 2016 elections. But for “SPEN”, all the key strategic and tactical appointments in the military were to go to Ewes on his proposals.

Thankfully, some realists saw the danger and political suicide inherent in my friend’s proposal and called for some moderation. Even with the moderation, the results are as follows as far as some Commanding Officers in the Ghana Army are concerned:

1BATTALION, MICHEL CAMP, TEMA – LT COL ALBERT SISIN OGAJA (GH/2694)-EWE, 2 BATTALION, TAKORADI- LT COL GEORGE NOBLE KWAKU HOENYEDZI (GH/2804)- EWE,  3 BATTALION, SUNYANI- LT COL EDWARD AWANBEY (GH/2712)- NORTHERNER, 4 BATTALION, KUMASI- LT COL IBRAHIM ABUKARI SALIFU (GH/2810)- NORTHERNER, 5 BATTALION, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL TIMOTHY TIFUORO BA-TAA-BANAH (GH/2699)- NORTHERNER, 6 BATTALION, TAMALE- LT COL WILLIAM ADARKWA KWABIA (GH/2753)- AKAN, AIRBONE FORCE, TAMALE- LT COL JOSEPH MALIK PUNAMANE (GH/2513)- NORTHERNER, 66 ARTILLERY REGIMENT, HO- LT COL JOHN ISHMAEL YAO BOGLO (GH/2701)- EWE, 64 INFANTRY REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL JOHN DANSO-ANKRAH (GH/2803)-AKAN, RECCE REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-LT COL WILLIAM NII NORTEY (GH/2758)-GA, 48 ENGINEER REGIMENT, TESHIE, ACCRA – LT COL RICHARD AGBEKO KINNEY (GH/2704)- EWE, 49 ENGINEER REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-LT COL ABEDNEGO ECLAIRCIE SHOOTER (GH/2823)-EWE, DEFENCE MT BATTALION, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL BESSA KWAO ADOTEY (GH/2752)- GA, BASE SUPPLY DEPOT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA – LT COL FUSEINI ABDULAI NANTOGMA (GH/2828)- NORTHERNER AND FORCES PAY REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-COLONEL SAMPANA BABILAH (GH/2340)-NORTHERNER 

In addition to these appointments, my friend is reported to have insisted on the appointment of a retired Warrant Officer (Ex CWO) Barker (an Ewe) as the Forces Sergeant Major (FSM). This appointment is extremely important. The holder of the FSM appointment becomes the senior-most Other Rank (Senior Non-Commissioned Officer) in the Armed Forces. Additionally, the Forces Sergeant Major is a member of the Armed Forces Council. 

As a member of the Armed Forces Council, the Forces Sergeant Major (though not a commissioned officer) is part of the decision making body that decides on promotions and appointments of senior military officers, colonels and above their equivalents in the Navy and Airforce.

That explains why my friend is insisting on the recall of a retired “Nyebro Soldier” to the office of Forces Sergeant Major and not the elevation of any of the serving Service or Formation Sergeant Majors to that enviable position. With that appointment, my and his brother Forces Sergeant Major will recommend the next Service and Formation Sergeant Majors.

A careful analysis of the list of Commanding Officers will show that my friend is indeed battle ready to ensure victory for our party in the December 2016 elections. For instance, the Commanding Officers for Takoradi (Western Region) and Ho (Volta Region) are all tribesmen of my friend. These no nonsense officers are to facilitate the in-and-out flow of non-Ghanaians resident in the Ivory Coast and Togo (Benin, Nigeria) through the Western and Eastern corridors respectively to vote in the elections.

Additionally, these officers are to ensure rigging in the Western and Volta Regions to give the NDC victory at all cost. Already, Commanding Officer 2 Battalion has withdrawn all military personnel on Task Force duties at the Ghana-Ivory Coast Border. The withdrawal took place just before the Limited Registration Exercise and continued during the Exhibition of Voter’s Register Exercise of the Electoral Commission. This same Commanding Officer was made the head of a Special Task Force that was sent from Accra by my friend to the Western Region during the last bye-election following the death of a Member of Parliament. The NDC retained the seat. 

This Special Task Force operated in the Area of Operation of 2 Battalion without the consent of then Commanding Officer who was an Akan and therefore not trusted by my #guyguy friend.

With Lt Col George Noble Kwaku Hoenyedzi at Apremdo, Tarkoradi, my friend is happy and sure of victory for the NDC in the Western Region.

Similarly, the positioning of Lt Col John Ishmael Yao Boglo at Ho, in charge of 66 Artillery Regiment, makes my friend extremely comfortable and sure of the Volta votes in exponential numbers for the NDC. 

With Lt Col Albert Sisin Ogaja at 1 Battalion with responsibility for the Eastern Region where the dream of Agenda 50-50 is to be realized, my friend is tactically in control of affairs with General Musah Whajah, an Nzema royal, as the GOC for Southern Command of the Ghana Army, the NDC is battle ready for the votes in Southern Ghana comprising of the Volta, Eastern, Greater Accra, Central and Western regions. 

General Musah Whajah has been an ardent member of the NDC since the days that he was an Other Rank. As a product of the Junior Leaders Company, (popularly called Boys’ company), General Whajah was an active member of the military CDR during the era of the PNDC. He held several key positions as an Other Rank and Officer. For instance, for several years, General Whajah was in charge of security at Tema Port and Harbour.

With General Peter Augustine Blay as his protégé, General Whajah has survived several storms including the latest from my friend. Anyways, my friend has not forgiven General Whajah for exposing him in the Bank of Ghana vehicle Saga. We (my friend and I) were hoping that General Musah Whajah would cover us but hell no; he gave us away like how Jesus was sold by Judas. If Musah was man enough, he should have issued a counter order to Commanding Officers under him to attend the handing over ceremony of the former Chief of Army Staff but smartly, he kept quite.

Musah we know is very powerful. The gods and juju from Benin (formerly Dahomey) have been consulted and used to silenced ‘some’ but Musah has proved very stubborn and the stubborn “ranger” is still alive but walking with difficulty.

The story in the Northern Sector of Ghana Army is not very different from the Southern Sector. The Central and Northern Commands of the Ghana Army are headed by a Northerner and an Ewe respectively in view of the “SPEN” strategy. 

With Brigadier General Cosmas Bretu Alhassan (a Northerner) as the GOC Central Command and based in Kumasi, Lieutenant Colonels Ibrahim Abukari Salifu and Edward Awanbey (Northerners) are to give him covering fire to subdue the opposition NPP in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions respectively.

Brigadier General Stanley Brian Alloh (an Ewe) has also been positioned at Tamale as the GOC Northern command of the Ghana Army to ensure NDC votes in the three Northern Regions of Ghana namely, Upper East, Upper West and the Northern Region proper. 

Brigadier General SB Alloh is to lead Lieutenant Colonels Joseph Malik Punamane (a Northerner) and William Adarkwa Kwabia (an Akan from Western Region) in the three Northern Regions to deflate the confidence of Dr. Bawumia in that sector and to deny the largest opposition essential votes from that sector to complement those from the strongholds in Ashanti and Eastern Regions. 

Very conscious of the important roles played by logistics in military operations, the SPEN has been respected to ensure maximum or optimum service support. For instance, Brigadier General Anthony Kwasi Dzisi (GH/2334), an Ewe, has taken over as the Defence Financial Controller (DFC) of the Ghana Armed Forces from Brigadier General Enusah Abdulai (GH/1915) a Northerner while Colonel S Babiah (a Northerner) has been retained as the Commanding Officer Forces Pay Regiment.

The two partners of the SPEN are to ensure the requisite ‘cash flows’ for all strategic and tactical operations in support of election victory for the leader of our community.

Also, Lieutenant Colonel Fuseni Abdulai Nantogma (a Northerner) has been maintained as the Commanding Officer Base Supply Depot as part of the SPEN to ensure that all the supplies (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants, Food etc) are made available to the troops on time for their operations, duties and tasks including galamsey activities where my friend earns something small for the many ‘side-chicks’.

There is no doubt that engineer services and resources would be required in some of the operations especially the dangerous and clandestine ones. For those reasons, Lieutenant Colonels Kinney and Shooter have been positioned at 48 and 49 Engineer Regiments respectively to support all the operations, duties and tasks of the military before, during and after the December 2016 elections. Thus, the Army is battle ready for the 2016 elections.

The Navy and the Airforce have not been left out or forgotten in the SPEN to ensure victory for our leader. The various Bases for the Navy and the Airforce have been strengthened to support the Army in all the operations.

In some cases, the Navy and the Airforce are to conduct independent operations on the sea, over water bodies and in the air space of Ghana. The Naval fleet and the individual ships have been structured to reflect the SPEN in their command and administration.

A vey significant appointment has been made in the Navy. The man who strategically and tactically ensured the positions, appointments and promotions of officers in the recent years, Naval Commodore Moses Beick-Baffour (GH/2073) an Ewe is now in charge of the Eastern Naval Command with its headquarters at Tema. 

With his Area of Operation and Responsibility covering Accra and slightly beyond in the West to Aflao parts of the sea in the East and the Volta Lake, Naval Commodore Moses Beick-Baffour is ready for the December 2016 elections.