The Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie’s Involvement In The ‘Condom’ Camouflage Uniforms Saga

The uniforms, most of which had already been worn, were donated by the Swiss Army to the  expatriate husband of Madam Maud Nongo (Supplier), who is a very good friend of Albert Gaisie. She therefore decided to sell the uniforms to the Fire Service after failed attempts to sell it to the Ghana Armed Forces but finally succeeded with the connivance of her friend Albert Gaisie, who was the then Acting Chief Fire Officer.

The contract document was signed by Albert Gaisie, who was the then Acting Chief Fire Officer and he intentionally did not indicate it in his handing over notes to Brig. Gen. J.B.E. Guyiri, who took over from him.

When the committee was established to investigate the issue, Albert Brown Gaisie, the main culprit was rather left off the hook and members of the Acceptance Board, whom he coerced and threatened to accept the uniforms were interdicted.

The matter was referred to EOCO and the report was made available only to him, all the other officers who were investigated were not given copies of the report. Justice Tsar, who happens to be a member of the EOCO Board and a good friend of Albert Gaisie is very much aware of this issue.

In relation to this, a petition was written by the late DCFO KWAKU OHENE OBIRI, the former Director Legal of GNFS, who died mysteriously in the early part of 2015 after being transferred from the National Headquarters to Volta region then some few months later again transferred to the Upper East Region, all aimed at frustrating  him.

The Facts of the aforesaid subject matter are as follows:

That I was the Director Legal for the Ghana National Fire Service (2009-2013)

That GNFS contracted JILD Ventures to supply 16,339 pairs of camouflage uniforms at a cost of GH₵ 789,663.87 in 2010

That the Ministerial Tender Review Board of the Ministry of Interior approved 16,339 pairs

That adverts in the Ghanaian Times edition of 25^th and 26^thMay, 2010 and the Daily Graphic edition of June, 2010 quoted 16,339 pairs

Opening of tender box at a meeting on 28^th June 2010 quoted 16,339 pairs and the amount quoted was GH₵ 789,663.87.

That the contract agreement between GNFS and JILD ventures was signed by Albert Brown Gaisie, the then Acting Chief Fire Officer quoted 16,339 pieces as the same amount.

That JILD ventures supplied the camouflage uniforms at the central stores James Town Accra and the Acceptance Board conducted an inspection on 15^th June, 2011 at 13:45 hours 

That recommendations of the acceptance board members, who were threatened and compelled by Albert Brown Gaisie, to approve the uniforms are as follows:

That the board accepted all camouflage uniforms supplied by JILD ventures to the Central Stores, though about half of the uniforms were used uniforms.

That all the camouflage uniforms inspected were in good condition.

That there was a disagreement between the parties as to the use of the words PAIRS AND PIECES with series of letters to the sector ministry and vice versa.

That the disagreement meant that the GNFS had to pay double the amount quoted delayed the payment for the camouflage uniforms

That the Plaintiff (JILD ventures) went to court to recover the Price of goods sold, Interest, Damages for Breach of Contract and Cost.

That all these transactions went on without involving me (the Director Legal).

That the order of the court was as follows:

GNFS to pay the principal sum of GH₵ 749,791.62,

Interest from 15^th August,2011 to the date of final payment.

Damages for Breach of Contract GH₵ 5,000.00

Cost GH₵ 5,000.00

The Fast Track High Court Accra, entered judgment against GNFS of the 8^th of June 2012

That an Application for Stay of Execution was put before the  Court on 6^th July 2012 but was refused on 24^th  July, 2013.

That the Application was repeated at the Court of Appeal.

That the Trial High Court proceeded to issue a Garnishee Proceeding against the accounts of GNFS held at the Bank of Ghana and Ghana Commercial Bank – Osu respectively.

That GNFS accordingly filed an application for Judicial Review on 11^thAugust,2012 before the Supreme Court, which quashed and set aside the Garnishee Order absolutely against GNFS account on 24^th January,2013

That the Fast Track High Court Garnishee Order dated 13^th May,2013,ordered the GNFS to pay a total amount of GH₵ 1,264,454.94.

That when the Camouflage uniforms were being distributed to staff, it was detected that;

Some of the uniforms have been used and washed

A great quantity are faded, tatted, patched and some with name tags and pens.

That the Fire Service Council and Management constituted a Board of Enquiry to investigate the matter and the findings are as follows;

That fire volunteers and NYEP Personnel were not employees of the Service but the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie, wanted to procure camouflage uniforms for them even though the Service Personnel lack adequate uniforms.

PNDC Law 229 gives the Service the only responsibility of training Fire volunteers and not to cloth them.

The Ministerial Tender Review Board gave approval for the procurement of 16,339 pairs of Camouflage uniforms and not pieces

That the contract and the notification letters were both prepared by the Albert Brown Gaisie without the involvement of the then Acting Director Logistics.

That the Contract Letter was signed on 1^st December,2010 and per the terms of the contract, the uniforms were to be supplied by 31^st January,2011,but JILD Ventures could not meet the deadline and thus the contract should have been abrogated by the then Acting Chief Fire Officer(Albert Brown Gaisie). He also failed to indicate in his handing over notes to Brigadier J.B.E. Guyiri, that the contract had expired, neither did he brief the Brigadier.

That the contract letter was not dispatched through the Service Central Registry.

That the reference number of the contract letter signed by the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie is foreign and anonymous to the Service’s Central Registry.

That the Acceptance Board failed to inspect all the camouflage uniforms to determine whether or not they met all the expectations. They did Random Sampling during inspecting and checking and never inspected and checked all items as indicated in their report.

That the Board of Enquiry INDICTED all the members of the Acceptance Board as well as the then Acting Chief Fire Officer at the time, Albert Brown Gaisie.

That the Director Legal was instructed by the GNFS Council Chairman, Alhaji Amadou Sorogho to constitute a Disciplinary Tribunal based on GNFS Disciplinary Regulations -2003  L.I. 1725,to try only the Acceptance Board Members, EXCLUDING- Albert Brown Gaisie.

That whiles the Disciplinary Tribunal was being constituted, the Fire Service Council instructed the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Brig. Gen. J.B.E. Guyiri, to suspend members of the Acceptance Board without Pay, whilst Albert Brown Gaisie was left unpunished.

That as the Legal Director, I gave my legal opinion to the Acting Chief Fire Officer on the GNFS Council’s decision to suspend the members of the Acceptance Board, which according to L.I. 1725,constitutes a Major Punishment.

That on 24^th December,2013, the GNFS council met and invited me(Director Legal) at 16:30 hours, for my legal opinion and why the delay in constituting the disciplinary tribunal.

That The delay in constituting the tribunal was because the Acting Chief Fire Officer lost the father and travelled to the Upper West Region, the Membership committee was later changed by the Chairman of the GNFS Council and there was the need for clarification for the suspension of the Acceptance Board members.

That my opinion as Director Legal was that the Council should have waited for the tribunal to try the Officers before meting out the suspension, which could amount to Double Jeopardy (Punishing an offender twice for the same offence).

That my submission as Director Legal, did not go down well with the Council especially the Chairman who categorically said that he could no longer work with me.

That immediately after the meeting, the Acting Chief Fire Officer was instructed by the Council to transfer me to the Volta Region as Regional Commander on or about 17:30 hours on 24^th December,2013, to take over from the late DCFO Attobrah who was sick and on admission at the Police Hospital and died later.

That Eight Months after my transfer, I was again transferred from the Volta Region to the Upper East Region, on 18^thSeptember,2014 as the Regional Commander, to take over from DCFO Edwin Blankson who was my junior and had been transferred to Headquarters.

That I strongly suspect someone’s interest is being protected by branding me as an NPP member and getting me out of National Headquarters, since I have all the facts and documents of the said case.

Facts Of The Case

In 2010 the Fire Service invited public tenders for the supply of various items including 16, 339 pairs of camouflage uniforms. The invitation for public tender was carried in the National Dailies in 2010.

Madam Nongo put in a tender and having been declared successful, entered into a formal contract with the GNFS for the supply of the camouflage uniforms.

Upon the delivery of the uniforms, the service took issue with the plaintiff that the contract was for the supply of 16,339 pairs of uniforms. The plaintiff, however, intimated that the formal agreement entered into with the defendant was for the supply of 16,339 pieces of uniforms and not 16,339 pairs as contended by the defendant.

Issues Set For Trial

After the service of the plaintiff’s writ of summons and its accompanying statement of claim on the defendant, an appearance was filed and later a Statement of Defence for and on behalf of the GNFS.

At the application for directions stage, the court adopted issues including, “Whether or not the invitation for tenders by the Defendant was an invitation to treat for the supply of 16,339 pairs of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff to the Defendant’, and whether or not the insertion of the word ‘pieces’ in the contract, dated, 1st December, 2010 was inadvertent and not pursuant to the invitation for tenders by the defendant.”

The court also looked at “whether or not the delivery of 8,373 and 7,757 pieces of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff was in accordance with the contract of 1st December, 2010.”

Issues Not In Dispute

According to the court, exhibits tendered showed that it was not in dispute, the plaintiff put in a tender to supply 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms from Switzerland at a price of GH¢48.33 a piece at a total cost of GH¢789,663.87.

It is also not in dispute that the GNFS, on November 25, 2010 addressed the plaintiff through a letter titled “Notification of Award: Supply of Camouflage Uniforms.

In the amount of GH¢789,663.87 in accordance with the instructions to Tenderers as hereby accepted.”

Analysis

The court said that some of the exhibits of the defendants had requested the plaintiff to furnish the GNFS with a Performance Bond “within 14 days of the receipt of Notification of Award of the Contract,” adding “as a result the plaintiff furnished a Performance Bond exhibit ‘E’ herein which she procured from Phoenix Insurance. Exhibit ‘E’ was dated 29^thNovember, 2010.”

“I find that by exhibit ‘F’ dated the 1^stday of December, 2010, the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “Supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms,” adding “there is evidence to the effect that after the execution of the contract, the plaintiff obtained a loan from the Bank and imported the camouflage uniforms.”

“I find from exhibit ‘2’ that the actual quantity of camouflage uniforms supplied by the plaintiff was 16,130 pieces comprising 8373 trousers and 7757 jackets. This finding is supported also by the plaintiff’s answer in admission during cross examination. Nevertheless, an inspection team formed by the defendant accepted the goods supplied by the plaintiff herein and wrote an acceptance report dated 7^thJuly, 2011 received in evidence.”

The court said it found that after the supply of the uniforms, the defendant paired them by way of one trouser to one jacket as a result of which 7757 pairs were generated leaving 616 excess trousers, adding that “these excess trousers of 616 were rejected by the defendant who then wrote exhibit ‘K’ a letter dated the 7th day of July, 2011 in which the defendant requested the plaintiff to submit fresh invoices for “7,757 full sets of camouflage uniforms or 15,514 pieces at a rate of GH¢48,33 per piece. Exhibit ‘K’ also requested the plaintiff to ‘take back the 616 pieces of trousers still in the possession of the defendant.”

The court said that there was evidence on record that despite directives from the Sector Minister that the GNFS pays for 15,514 pieces of uniforms as a result of which some exhibits were requested and furnished, the defendant was still unwilling to pay the plaintiff the cost as directed.

“The plaintiff’s lawyer, therefore, wrote to the Minister a letter dated the 22nd August, 2011 pointing out the fact of non-compliance with the Minister’s directives by the defendant.”

“The court finds that the defendant’s unwillingness to pay for the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had accepted arose from various correspondences between it and the Ministry for Interior.”

Fire Service Council

Justice Kwame Asiedu said that the court found the evidence on record that the Fire Service Council played a major role in the non-payment of the plaintiff for the goods which she supplied and were accepted by the defendant saying “there is evidence that the Fire Service Council met on the 13^th July, 2011.”

“In the opinion of the court the Fire Service Council fell into a grievous error when it stated, without recourse to the contract document, that “naturally uniforms are worn in pairs,” adding, “The court can take judicial notice of the fact that whether apparel can pass for ‘uniform’ depends on the organisation concerned.”

Pieces vrs Pairs

The court found that evidence adduce at the trial was that it was not entirely correct as stated by the Fire Service Council that uniforms are worn in pairs, adding “the defendant did not contract with the plaintiff for the supply of what are ‘worn in pairs’. Rather the contract evidenced by exhibit ‘F’ was for the supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.”

“Even in the Fire Service, uniform is not necessarily a reference to a particular shirt and trouser but it includes the cup and the boots as well as the socks and the belt and many others apparels on the dress worn sometimes with reference to the rank of the officer in question.”

Justice Asiedu held that per the evidence adduced, the invitation for tender published in the various newspapers was not part of the contract documents, adding “hence it was wrongful for the Fire Service Council to rely on the invitation to treat as constituting a contract and then say that uniforms are naturally worn in pairs.”

“Worse still in the 21st century, where the law is held supreme, it sounds oppressive and totalitarian for the Fire Service Council to conclude as it did that: ‘Should this arrangement not be acceptable to the supplier then the entire consignment delivered by the supplier should be rejected’.”

“Within the context of exhibit “F” the contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendant herein, the word ‘piece’ as used in the phrase ‘supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms’ in my view, therefore, cannot be interpreted to read ‘pairs’.”

“That will surely amount to re-writing the contract for the parties. In my opinion given the context in which ‘piece’ has been used in the contract between the parties, the most appropriate meaning is that which connotes singleness or a unit of. Hence, the phrase “16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms” will imply “16,339 units of camouflage uniforms or units of camouflage uniforms which adds up to 16, 339,” the judge held.

The court held that the GNFS contracted with the plaintiff to supply parts of or sections of or individual items or units of uniforms that sums up in total to 16, 339, adding that “in the view of the court it will be unconscionable for the defendant to contract with the plaintiff to supply 16, 339 pieces of uniforms at GH¢48. 33 per piece and then when it comes to paying for the commodity for the defendant to turn round to say a ‘piece’ means ‘pairs’ to enable the defendant take two pieces for the price of one piece contrary to the agreement as shown in the contract exhibit ‘F’.”

“The plaintiff put in a tender for the supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. Subsequently, the defendant, on 25th November, 2010 wrote a ‘notification of award – supply of camouflage uniforms’ to the plaintiff evidenced by exhibit ‘D’. Here again, the defendant indicated to the plaintiff that she was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. Then on the 1st December, 2010 the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms”.

In my opinion the GNFS has exhibited all the outward signs of agreement that the plaintiff was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. I hold that the defendant is bound by the contract to which it had manifestly and voluntarily expressed its assent even if its actual intentions were different.”

The judge said that if the GNFS had in fact made a mistake by its inability to express its intentions clearly on the contract document by stating ‘16,339 pieces’ instead of ‘16,339 pairs’, the plaintiff should not be the one to suffer for it, holding that “the defendant must bear the brunt and the consequences of its own mistake. I hold, therefore, that the defendant – Ghana National Fire Service is bound to pay for all the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had by exhibit ‘H’ accepted.”

The court also acknowledged that the plaintiff agreed to take back six hundred and sixteen (616) pieces of the trousers supplied and ruled that “the defendant is, therefore, liable to the plaintiff for the cost of the remainder of the goods totalling 15,514 pieces at GH¢48.33 which sums up to GH¢749,791.62.”

In the end, the court had entered an amount of GH¢749,791.62 as judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant and also held that the plaintiff was also entitled to recover interest in view of the delay in the payment by the defendant.

Costs of GH¢5,000.00 was also awarded against the defendant.

The GNFS was represented in court by DOIII Emmanuel Jiaggey with Cecil Adadevor supported by Tricia Quartey as counsel for the GNFS while Ken Anku, holding the brief of Acquah Sampson, represented the plaintiff on judgement day which was August 8, 2012.

Source: Eagle-Eyed Vigilante Group

U.N. Peacekeepers’ Pay Dispute Is Resolved

Diplomats on Thursday resolved an unusually bitter dispute over how much United Nations peacekeepers should be paid.

The countries that send troops, mostly from South Asia and Africa, are currently paid an average of $1,210 per soldier per month, a rate that has not changed for about a decade.

The payments will increase gradually over the next four years, according to an agreement that is expected to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly, to just over $1,400.

The countries contributing troops had wanted a rate of more than $1,700, based on an estimate provided by the United Nations Secretariat. Countries that fund peacekeeping missions — the United States, Japan and France are the largest funders — called that demand unrealistic.

The total peacekeeping budget has increased to $8.6 billion, a record, though as the United Nations points out, that are less than 1 percent of total military expenditures worldwide. Each country decides how much of the reimbursement rate goes to individual soldiers.

Source: SOMINI SENGUPTA JULY 3, 2014, New York Times

Osama Bin Laden's death: How it happened

The US operation to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden was months in the planning but took just minutes to complete. 

In a daring raid 120 miles (192km) inside Pakistan, a team of US special forces flew from Afghanistan to Bin Laden's hiding place in the dead of night. They swooped down on the compound in stealth helicopters, swept through the buildings within the high walled enclosure and shot dead a total of five people including Bin Laden.

Around 40 minutes later they left, taking with them Bin Laden's body and a hoard of computer data devices and other information containing intelligence about al-Qaeda and Bin Laden's activities.

They left behind the other dead, among whom were a woman and one of Bin Laden's sons. They also left a group of three women and 13 children - two girls and 11 boys - bound with plastic ties.

The US team was forced to abandon one of its helicopters after it was damaged in a hard landing at the compound site. It was mostly destroyed in an explosion set by the US forces as they departed.

Publicly, the US authorities have given few details about the raid and some of these have changed since the news of Bin Laden's death was officially announced. 

'Something nasty' 

What follows has been pieced together from official US statements and off-the-record interviews, other news sources and BBC interviews with those living near the compound in Abbottabad, the quiet, leafy garrison town 35 miles north of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. 

Just a handful of US military and senior officials around President Obama knew of the planned raid. However, within seconds of the arrival of the US helicopters overhead in Abbottabad on Monday, their presence was being advertised on Twitter. 

"Helicopter hovering above Abbotttabad at 1am (is a rare event)," tweeted Sohaib Athar, an IT engineer who lives about 3km (two miles) from the compound. 

Eleven minutes later Athar reported: "A huge window-shaking bang here in Abbottabad. I hope it's not the start of something nasty." 

On the other side of the world President Obama and his closest advisers had gathered in the White House situation room to monitor progress of the assault. A few miles away, at CIA headquarters, the spy agency's director Leon Panetta sat in a windowless seventh floor room, which had been turned into a command centre. 

From there he fed the president and his team details of the raid as it unfolded. The operation now under way was the culmination of weeks of detailed surveillance and planning involving some of the United States' most sophisticated technology. 

Planning for the raid started late last year. US officials have spoken of how an intercept in late August 2010 of a phone call to a trusted courier of Bin Laden in Pakistan was a breakthrough that led to the raid.

The call was made to Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, a man the US had been seeking for years as part of the decade long hunt for Bin Laden. Controversially, they had learnt of his identity from interrogations of detainees in Guantanamo. Armed with the mobile phone number, the US was able to track him to the compound in Abbottabad. 

The pacer 

It was unusual. High walls prevented anyone from seeing in and privacy screens on the main building's balconies blocked all sight lines. It had no phone or internet connection and all rubbish was burnt inside the high walls rather than being collected as usual.

Access to the site was through a tall green metal security gate which led into a passageway with high walls either side, and another security gate leading to an inner compound at the other end.

According to neighbours who spoke to the BBC, the occupants rarely went out and when they did so - in either a red Suzuki jeep or van - they passed through security doors that closed immediately afterwards.
US intelligence soon began an intensive period of surveillance. While satellites watched from the sky a CIA safe house was set up nearby.

From the safe house, agents were able to observe the comings and goings from the compound in order to establish a "pattern of life" at the building. Some details of how they tried to obtain key information about the building have emerged.

Locals told the BBC that in the weeks leading up to the raid, people in "simple, plain clothes" knocked on doors in the neighbourhood posing as prospective property buyers. They would admire the homes and ask for any architectural plans, saying that they wanted to build something similar. 

One of the men even went to Bin Laden's compound to make inquiries, they said. 

The CIA also employed a sophisticated stealth drone that could float high about the compound without detection by the Pakistani authorities. 

With its distinctive bat-winged shape, the RQ170 Sentinel is capable of flying undetected at high altitude taking photographs and sending real-time video. The aircraft can also capture images shot at an angle. This has the advantage of not having to fly directly over its target. 

Despite the presence on the ground and observation from the sky, the CIA was still unable to positively identify Bin Laden as the man often spotted often walking up and down outside the house. Agents dubbed him "the pacer". 

He and his associates went to extraordinary efforts to remain undetected. According to a detailed account of the lead-up to the raid in the Washington Post, US officials were "stunned to realise that whenever Kuwaiti or others left to make a call, they drove for 90 minutes before placing" a battery in a mobile phone.

In the meantime, a team from the secretive US Navy Seal Team 6 unit, had been practising storming a mock up of the compound, constructed at US bases on both coasts. 

The raid

 

In the end, after months of investigation, the US had no conclusive proof of Bin Laden's presence in the compound. As President Obama told CBS television news, "this was still a 55/45 situation."

Nevertheless, 2 May presented a moonless night on which to mount the raid. The president formally gave the go-ahead on the morning of Friday 29 April.

But despite the detailed planning, the operation began to go wrong almost as soon as the raiders appeared overhead. 

Five aircraft flew two teams of Navy Seals from a US base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, into Pakistan. Three large Chinook helicopters carrying a back-up team of 24 Seals put down near the Indus River, a 10-minute flight from the compound. 

The two other aircraft, specially adapted Black Hawk helicopters, flew on to Abbottabad. On board, were 23 Seals, a translator and a tracking dog called Cairo. Three of the Seals were specifically tasked to seek out Bin Laden. 

In the original plan, one of the helicopters was to hover over the main building allowing the Seals to clamber down ropes onto the roof. The other was to drop its team within the grounds of the compound. This should have taken just a couple of minutes allowing the aircraft to fly away, thereby attracting less attention. 

However, on arrival, the Black Hawk hovering over Bin Laden's building skittered around in the heat-thinned air forcing the pilot to ditch the craft into the ground. It made a hard landing inside the compound but its tail and rotor caught on one of the high walls.

The other aircraft immediately landed outside the walls. Both teams clambered out unhurt but they had now lost the element of surprise and had to start blasting their way into the compound. 

Behind the perimeter walls were further inner walls cordoning off the three-storey main building where Bin Laden and his family lived and a smaller single-storey guard house. 

Leon Panetta, the CIA chief, has said the commandos blasted their way through "three or four" walls to get into the buildings. As the raid got under way, Panetta said, he and those in the White House situation room were in the dark for "around 20-25 minutes" as to what was actually going on in the compound.

According to US officials, as the members of the US team moved to search the buildings they were fired on by one of the two brothers who were close confidantes of Bin Laden. Al-Kuwaiti is said to have fired from behind a door of the guard house. The Navy Seals killed him and his wife, who reportedly made a lunge for the soldiers. 

Moving into the main building the commandos come across al-Kuwaiti's brother on the ground floor. Believing that he was about to shoot, they shot him dead. On the way up the stairs, Bin Laden's adult son, Khalid Bin Laden, met the Navy Seal team. He too was shot and killed. 

'We got him' 

On the top floor the trio of Seals looking for Bin Laden found him, some 20 minutes into the raid, standing at the end of the corridor. They recognised him immediately. He also saw them and ducked back inside a room.

Initial US accounts of the mission said that before he was killed he had exchanged fire with the commandos while using his wife as a human shield. US officials have now told the Associated Press news agency that after the Seals rushed into the room, they found two women in front of Bin Laden, screaming and trying to protect him. 

One of the soldiers pushed the women aside, the Seal behind him fired at Bin Laden, hitting him in the head and chest killing him instantly. 

A later account from one of the Seals involved in the raid suggested that there was no fire fight with the US soldiers. 

According to this account, Bin Laden was killed as soon as he stuck his head out of his bedroom. He was still alive although badly injured when the Seal team entered the room where they shot him again killing him.

After the shooting, one of the soldiers radioed his commanders: "Geronimo EKIA". In the cold military jargon, "EKIA" (Enemy killed in action) signalled that the team had killed their target. 

The message was relayed to the White House where President Obama is said to have received the news with a terse "We got him". Those in the situation room did not see the moment of Bin Laden's death. 

Geronimo, it has been suggested was the code name for Bin Laden, but US officials have indicated that this referred to the stage in the operation in which Bin Laden was either captured or killed. 

As they began photographing his body, an AK-47 and a Russian-made Makarov pistol were discovered in the room, but Bin Laden had not touched them. 

Earlier reports suggested that Bin Laden's wife, believed to be 29-year-old Amal al-Ahmed Sadah, was in the room with him and was shot in the leg when she lunged at the soldiers. Pakistani police say that the couple's 12-year-old daughter was also in the room and witnessed Bin Laden's death.

As the minutes ticked by, a suspicious Pakistani air force began scrambling some of its fighter jets, heightening fears in Washington that the US commandos could still be in danger as they tried to return to Afghanistan.

Pakistan was not tipped off in advance about the raid although a Pakistani intelligence official told the BBC that once US helicopters entered Pakistan air space the US officials told their counterparts that an operation was under way against "a high value target". They were not told the target was Bin Laden. This ultimately led to the jets being called back.

With Bin Laden dead, the US team prepared to leave.

They trawled through the rest of the compound collecting a "treasure trove" of documents, computer hard drives, memory sticks and other material that could provide useful intelligence.

One of the Chinooks flew in to collect the team from the broken helicopter. They loaded up Bin Laden's body, corralled those still alive into a room, piled explosives into the damaged aircraft and blew it up. They then left for the US air base in Bagram, Afghanistan.

One neighbour in Abbottabad told the BBC how one of the departing helicopters swept past his house, "flying very low, coming very close".

"I threw myself to the ground thinking it was going to collide with my house," Zahoor Abbasi said.

From there Bin Laden's body was flown to the USS Carl Vinson, a US aircraft carrier in the north Arabian sea, where Bin Laden was prepared for burial. A White House spokesman said the corpse was prepared for burial "in conformance with Islamic precepts and practice", then placed in a weighted bag and dropped into the water from the vessel's deck.

Officials said this was to prevent his grave from becoming a shrine.

Source:  Adrian Brown