Ghana Military Academy To Be Moved?

Probably, the biggest problem Ghana Military Academy (GMA) suffers from is its co-location with MATS at Teshie. Organizationally, GMA is one of the thirteen training institutions that come under the Commandants of MATS.

GMA therefore does not enjoy the independence or autonomy that other military academies enjoy. To give a few examples, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, the India Military Academy, Dehra Dun, India and the National Defence Academy (NDA) Nigeria are all autonomous schools commanded by Major Generals. In all respect therefore, particularly in the area of finance, the Commandant is the sole authority.

IN GMA, HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT THE CASE. INDEED, AS HAS BEEN STATED EARLIER, SOME COMMANDANTS OF MATS SEE GMA AS A UNIT UNDER THEM AND TRY UNDULY TO INTERFERE WITH GMA’S ACTIVITIES PARTICULARLY WITH THE ACADEMY BUDGET. THIS HAS OFTEN LED TO CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMANDANTS MATS AND COS GMA.

The solution to this age-old problem is to change the present organization and move GMA away from its present location to a site where it will be completely autonomous as is the case in the examples given. Sandhurst, Dehra Dun and NDA are all commanded by Major Generals.

FURTHERMORE, THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT THAT HAS GMA AS A UNIT UNDER MATS FORMATION AND THEREFORE MAKES BASIC DEMANDS LIKE ROUTINE LETTERS TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS BEING ROUTED THROUGH MATS HQ HAS PROVED ANACHRONISTIC.

Double handling and resultant time wastage aside, this arrangement demeans the status of GMA as the only institution responsible for producing officers for the Ghana Armed Forces.

GMA MUST BE AN AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTION WITH ITS OWN BUDGET AND A COMMANDANT WHO REPORTS DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF IN CONSONANCE WITH THE TRI-SERVICE NATURE OF THE INSTITUTION. THIS SITUATION MAY BE LIKENED TO WHAT HAPPENS AT THE GHANA ARMED FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE WHERE THE COMMANDANT DEALS DIRECTLY WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF. WITH ALL THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND REPUTATION GMA HAS, WHAT IS WRONG WITH HAVING AT LEAST A BRIGADIER AS THE HEAD?

 

Again, to bring it in line with convention in military academies modeled on Sandhurst lines, the present title of the head as Commanding Officer of the Ghana Military Academy must reviewed and possibly changed to the Commandant of the Ghana Military Academy.

Another reason for advocating GMA’s movement from the present location is that, when it was established in the 1960s, there were no nearby settlements which interfered with training.

To the north of GMA, there was an open stretch of savannah grassland of over ten kiloimetres to Madina. Eastwards, there was an equally long stretch of land to Ashaiman. Today, all these areas are fully built up with GMA hemmed in.

The result is that there is no local training area to practice basic drills taught in the classroom as was the case in my days as a cadet in the early 1970s. The logistic strain of constantly moving cadets out of GMA to practice basic field drills can be imagined

.

A pertinent question which arises immediately is, where can GMA be moved to, considering the serious financial implications this will entail? 

Providence appears to have given an ideal location for GMA’s future relocation. Just an hour’s drive north-east of Teshie is the Asutware Camp.

This old camp occupies the northern part of the Shai Hills which is itself part of the Bundase training area.

With only a little bit of modification, the Asutware Camp can be developed into an ideal place for the GMA.

It is only an hour’s drive from Accra but sufficiently far to keep cadets and instructors alike from any distractions.

Once the problem of relocation has been solved, the next issue will be that of instructors and their stability in GMA. Because of Ghana’s unique role in international peacekeeping operations, instructors in GMA often have to break their tour to contribute towards such operations. Added to this is the sometimes erratic bulk posting of instructors out of GMA at the same time. When this happens, experience built over time is suddenly lost.

A possible solution to this problem could be the posting of officers to GMA for a fixed period of between two and three years during which there should be no break in service for any course or operation. Once the instructor finishes his tour, he could then be recompensed for his sacrifice with an overseas course and a long tour of duty on a UN peacekeeping mission.

Again, periodic visits by GMA instructors to foreign military academies and training institutions will give the instructor greater exposure and by implication a better output from him.

Similarly, foreign instructors could be invited on a reciprocal basis to share their experiences with GMA instructors. This way, instructors will show more commitment and dedication knowing that they would have nothing to lose while teaching in GMA.

Additionally, the point has been made that for very obvious reasons the instructor in GMA deserves some allowance. The GMA instructor routinely travels away from home and family on exercises. The emotional as well as the physical demands exacted on him cannot be overemphasized.

In the mosquito endemic zone we find ourselves in, malaria naturally takes its toll on the instructor. By the very nature of the job, the GMA instructor has to make several out of hours trips to GMA using his own car and well turned out in mufti at all times. All this impinges on the finances of the GMA instructor.

Currently, between the two regular courses and the one SSC/SD course, GMA takes a maximum of about one hundred cadets. This limitation is imposed by classrooms and accommodation. Once GMA moves into a location with bigger facilities, the intake of cadets can be increased to improve on the current average of sixty cadets commissioned every year, which appears to be on the low side, especially with the very high attrition rate particularly of young officers. 

The next issue to be looked at is that of the minimum entry requirements for the regular cadet. After being pegged at the General Certificate of Education Advance Level since the 1970s, the minimum entry requirement was lowered to the Senior Secondary School Certificate of Education in 1998.

In the rapidly changing, technologically advanced world of the twenty-first century, where frontiers of human knowledge are being pushed further with higher and better education, it is simply inappropriate to go in the opposite direction by reducing educational standards for future officers of the Ghana Armed Forces.

I have stated earlier on in this book that, rather sadly, interest in GMA by the staff appears to be only once a year and that is during graduation in August. This national function which has the parade reviewed by the head of state is the only occasion that staff officers from the service headquarters visit GMA.

Incidentally, and maybe rather unfortunately, the parade more or less serves as the yardstick for judging GMA’s performance over the year. Whatever difficulties the academy encountered during the year does not appear to matter once the parade is very successful.

GMA is a tri-service institution and it is highly recommended that staff officers from Army, Navy and Airforce Headquarters take more interest in GMA activities.

Again, alumni of GMA do not associate with GMA in any way. So far, only the members of Regular Intake 20 have been kind enough to support GMA. The group provided 4 lecterns: one each for the officer Cadet’s Mess and the rooms of the courses.

This has been a laudable gesture and I hope that many more intakes would begin to associate with the Academy in various ways. Alas, intakes senior or junior to these pacesetters have not followed in the good example.

The relationship between alumni of GMA and the Academy is an important one. Apart from the material support ensures that facilities are adequate, the moral support to the instructors and cadets is immense. Many more of these alumni have good ideas for the development of the GMA and our officer crop. Such associations and interactions will help us tap these plans for the general good of GAF.

Again, in recent times, a trend has emerged towards separate commissions and graduation parade by individual service. The Ghana Military Academy is a tri-service institution and the only one responsible for the training of cadets for commission into the Ghana Armed Forces. 

In August 2001, for example, fifty cadets were commissioned at GMA, Teshie. Then two months later in October 2001, nine naval cadets were commissioned at Sekondi. Finally, two months later again in December 2001, nine airforce cadets were commissioned in Takoradi. The question is if GMA is a tri-service institution and the only one charged with the responsibility of training cadets, why did we have three commissions in a space of only five months between August and December 2001 for a total of less than eighty cadets?

What justification was there for expending all the time, energy and meager resources available on three specific graduations at a time when Ghana had declared itself a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)?

It is strongly recommended that graduation must be held once a year for all graduating cadets at the Ghana Military Academy, possibly in August as has been the case for some time now. Piecemeal graduations as are becoming the vogue now only fritter away limited resources.

Finally, GMA which started in 1960 out of the ashes of the 1953-bron Regular Officers Special Training School has trained over three thousand cadets into commissioned officers not only for the Ghana Armed Forces but also for sister African countries like Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Uganda.

Without doubt, GMA has maintained a very high standard as an institution of excellence for cadet training comparable with any in the developed world. What problems I have identified and discussed are purely institutional and human problems one expects in any human institution.

The recommendations made therefore are just aimed at improving on GMA’s already high standards in our quest to maintain and possibly improve it as a center of excellence for cadet training.

It is my fervent hope that, once these problems are resolved, GMA will continue to grow from strength to strength as it continues to provide highly motivated educated leaders of character imbued with the academy’s motto of SERVICE, DEVOTION and SACRIFICE to serve mother Ghana, or indeed any sister African country they may  come from.

It is my hope that, with such disciplined and educated officers of character who understand and acknowledge the supremacy of the constitution at the helm of affairs, the Ghana Armed Forces and others in Africa will develop the cordiality and mutual respect with our civilian kith and kin.

In this way, the necessary enabling environment will be provided for governments to focus on national development to propel us forward. 

Culled from LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGES OF COMMAND by Brigadier General Daniel Kwadjo Frimpong (page 126 titled THE FUTURE)

Ethnocentricism In Our Community

Recent promotions and appointments in the Ghana Armed Forces in particular and other security services in general continue to confirm that the Symbiotic Partnership of Ewes and Northerners (SPEN) have taken over.

Consequently, a lion’s share of all appointments and promotions, especially the strategic and tactical ones have been given to them. That explains why Major General Sampson Adeti (my friend) is parading round like the de facto Chief of Defence Staff. As a matter of fact, he is the most powerful military officer in the Ghana Armed Forces today usurping the powers of the Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Most seasoned military officers and military analysts have likened him to General Arnold Quainoo- the Buffalo Soldier. These experts say that my friend is behaving in much the same way as General Quainoo when he was the Force Commander of the Ghana Armed Forces thereby combining the positions of Army Commander and Chief of Defence Staff effectively.

In the days of General Quainoo, the other Service Commanders were cowed into submission and thus enabling General Quainoo to have a field day to run the affairs of the Ghana Armed Forces as he wished.

In those days, General Quainoo was a member of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and thus a politician as well. General Quainoo was part of the two major Arms of Government, the Executive and the legislature as the PNDC had both – Executive and legislative powers of Ghana vested in it by virtue of the PNDC Establishment and Proclamation laws which suspended the Third Republican Constitution of 1979 and the government of Dr. Hilla Limann.

IN THE SCHEME OF AFFAIRS TODAY, MY FRIEND HAS REPLACED GENERAL QUAINOO. HE IS THE MAN TO BE FEARED BOTH IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS. AS A MEMBER OF THE NDC, MY FRIEND FEARS NOBODY AND HAS MILITARY AND EXECUTIVE POWERS. HE IS SAID TO BE BEST BET OF PRESIDENT RAWLINGS AND SOME MINISTERS WHO RELY ON HIM FOR LAND-GUARD DUTIES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ON LANDS FOR ILLEGAL MINING AND EVEN PROTECTION AT PLUSH ESTATES IN THE CAPITAL.

No appointment or promotion can be made in the Ghana Armed Forces without his input, consent and/or approval. He is currently fine-tuning all the strategic and tactical appointments in the Ghana Armed Forces to ensure victory for our leader in the 2016 elections. But for “SPEN”, all the key strategic and tactical appointments in the military were to go to Ewes on his proposals.

Thankfully, some realists saw the danger and political suicide inherent in my friend’s proposal and called for some moderation. Even with the moderation, the results are as follows as far as some Commanding Officers in the Ghana Army are concerned:

1BATTALION, MICHEL CAMP, TEMA – LT COL ALBERT SISIN OGAJA (GH/2694)-EWE, 2 BATTALION, TAKORADI- LT COL GEORGE NOBLE KWAKU HOENYEDZI (GH/2804)- EWE,  3 BATTALION, SUNYANI- LT COL EDWARD AWANBEY (GH/2712)- NORTHERNER, 4 BATTALION, KUMASI- LT COL IBRAHIM ABUKARI SALIFU (GH/2810)- NORTHERNER, 5 BATTALION, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL TIMOTHY TIFUORO BA-TAA-BANAH (GH/2699)- NORTHERNER, 6 BATTALION, TAMALE- LT COL WILLIAM ADARKWA KWABIA (GH/2753)- AKAN, AIRBONE FORCE, TAMALE- LT COL JOSEPH MALIK PUNAMANE (GH/2513)- NORTHERNER, 66 ARTILLERY REGIMENT, HO- LT COL JOHN ISHMAEL YAO BOGLO (GH/2701)- EWE, 64 INFANTRY REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL JOHN DANSO-ANKRAH (GH/2803)-AKAN, RECCE REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-LT COL WILLIAM NII NORTEY (GH/2758)-GA, 48 ENGINEER REGIMENT, TESHIE, ACCRA – LT COL RICHARD AGBEKO KINNEY (GH/2704)- EWE, 49 ENGINEER REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-LT COL ABEDNEGO ECLAIRCIE SHOOTER (GH/2823)-EWE, DEFENCE MT BATTALION, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA- LT COL BESSA KWAO ADOTEY (GH/2752)- GA, BASE SUPPLY DEPOT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA – LT COL FUSEINI ABDULAI NANTOGMA (GH/2828)- NORTHERNER AND FORCES PAY REGIMENT, BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-COLONEL SAMPANA BABILAH (GH/2340)-NORTHERNER 

In addition to these appointments, my friend is reported to have insisted on the appointment of a retired Warrant Officer (Ex CWO) Barker (an Ewe) as the Forces Sergeant Major (FSM). This appointment is extremely important. The holder of the FSM appointment becomes the senior-most Other Rank (Senior Non-Commissioned Officer) in the Armed Forces. Additionally, the Forces Sergeant Major is a member of the Armed Forces Council. 

As a member of the Armed Forces Council, the Forces Sergeant Major (though not a commissioned officer) is part of the decision making body that decides on promotions and appointments of senior military officers, colonels and above their equivalents in the Navy and Airforce.

That explains why my friend is insisting on the recall of a retired “Nyebro Soldier” to the office of Forces Sergeant Major and not the elevation of any of the serving Service or Formation Sergeant Majors to that enviable position. With that appointment, my and his brother Forces Sergeant Major will recommend the next Service and Formation Sergeant Majors.

A careful analysis of the list of Commanding Officers will show that my friend is indeed battle ready to ensure victory for our party in the December 2016 elections. For instance, the Commanding Officers for Takoradi (Western Region) and Ho (Volta Region) are all tribesmen of my friend. These no nonsense officers are to facilitate the in-and-out flow of non-Ghanaians resident in the Ivory Coast and Togo (Benin, Nigeria) through the Western and Eastern corridors respectively to vote in the elections.

Additionally, these officers are to ensure rigging in the Western and Volta Regions to give the NDC victory at all cost. Already, Commanding Officer 2 Battalion has withdrawn all military personnel on Task Force duties at the Ghana-Ivory Coast Border. The withdrawal took place just before the Limited Registration Exercise and continued during the Exhibition of Voter’s Register Exercise of the Electoral Commission. This same Commanding Officer was made the head of a Special Task Force that was sent from Accra by my friend to the Western Region during the last bye-election following the death of a Member of Parliament. The NDC retained the seat. 

This Special Task Force operated in the Area of Operation of 2 Battalion without the consent of then Commanding Officer who was an Akan and therefore not trusted by my #guyguy friend.

With Lt Col George Noble Kwaku Hoenyedzi at Apremdo, Tarkoradi, my friend is happy and sure of victory for the NDC in the Western Region.

Similarly, the positioning of Lt Col John Ishmael Yao Boglo at Ho, in charge of 66 Artillery Regiment, makes my friend extremely comfortable and sure of the Volta votes in exponential numbers for the NDC. 

With Lt Col Albert Sisin Ogaja at 1 Battalion with responsibility for the Eastern Region where the dream of Agenda 50-50 is to be realized, my friend is tactically in control of affairs with General Musah Whajah, an Nzema royal, as the GOC for Southern Command of the Ghana Army, the NDC is battle ready for the votes in Southern Ghana comprising of the Volta, Eastern, Greater Accra, Central and Western regions. 

General Musah Whajah has been an ardent member of the NDC since the days that he was an Other Rank. As a product of the Junior Leaders Company, (popularly called Boys’ company), General Whajah was an active member of the military CDR during the era of the PNDC. He held several key positions as an Other Rank and Officer. For instance, for several years, General Whajah was in charge of security at Tema Port and Harbour.

With General Peter Augustine Blay as his protégé, General Whajah has survived several storms including the latest from my friend. Anyways, my friend has not forgiven General Whajah for exposing him in the Bank of Ghana vehicle Saga. We (my friend and I) were hoping that General Musah Whajah would cover us but hell no; he gave us away like how Jesus was sold by Judas. If Musah was man enough, he should have issued a counter order to Commanding Officers under him to attend the handing over ceremony of the former Chief of Army Staff but smartly, he kept quite.

Musah we know is very powerful. The gods and juju from Benin (formerly Dahomey) have been consulted and used to silenced ‘some’ but Musah has proved very stubborn and the stubborn “ranger” is still alive but walking with difficulty.

The story in the Northern Sector of Ghana Army is not very different from the Southern Sector. The Central and Northern Commands of the Ghana Army are headed by a Northerner and an Ewe respectively in view of the “SPEN” strategy. 

With Brigadier General Cosmas Bretu Alhassan (a Northerner) as the GOC Central Command and based in Kumasi, Lieutenant Colonels Ibrahim Abukari Salifu and Edward Awanbey (Northerners) are to give him covering fire to subdue the opposition NPP in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions respectively.

Brigadier General Stanley Brian Alloh (an Ewe) has also been positioned at Tamale as the GOC Northern command of the Ghana Army to ensure NDC votes in the three Northern Regions of Ghana namely, Upper East, Upper West and the Northern Region proper. 

Brigadier General SB Alloh is to lead Lieutenant Colonels Joseph Malik Punamane (a Northerner) and William Adarkwa Kwabia (an Akan from Western Region) in the three Northern Regions to deflate the confidence of Dr. Bawumia in that sector and to deny the largest opposition essential votes from that sector to complement those from the strongholds in Ashanti and Eastern Regions. 

Very conscious of the important roles played by logistics in military operations, the SPEN has been respected to ensure maximum or optimum service support. For instance, Brigadier General Anthony Kwasi Dzisi (GH/2334), an Ewe, has taken over as the Defence Financial Controller (DFC) of the Ghana Armed Forces from Brigadier General Enusah Abdulai (GH/1915) a Northerner while Colonel S Babiah (a Northerner) has been retained as the Commanding Officer Forces Pay Regiment.

The two partners of the SPEN are to ensure the requisite ‘cash flows’ for all strategic and tactical operations in support of election victory for the leader of our community.

Also, Lieutenant Colonel Fuseni Abdulai Nantogma (a Northerner) has been maintained as the Commanding Officer Base Supply Depot as part of the SPEN to ensure that all the supplies (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants, Food etc) are made available to the troops on time for their operations, duties and tasks including galamsey activities where my friend earns something small for the many ‘side-chicks’.

There is no doubt that engineer services and resources would be required in some of the operations especially the dangerous and clandestine ones. For those reasons, Lieutenant Colonels Kinney and Shooter have been positioned at 48 and 49 Engineer Regiments respectively to support all the operations, duties and tasks of the military before, during and after the December 2016 elections. Thus, the Army is battle ready for the 2016 elections.

The Navy and the Airforce have not been left out or forgotten in the SPEN to ensure victory for our leader. The various Bases for the Navy and the Airforce have been strengthened to support the Army in all the operations.

In some cases, the Navy and the Airforce are to conduct independent operations on the sea, over water bodies and in the air space of Ghana. The Naval fleet and the individual ships have been structured to reflect the SPEN in their command and administration.

A vey significant appointment has been made in the Navy. The man who strategically and tactically ensured the positions, appointments and promotions of officers in the recent years, Naval Commodore Moses Beick-Baffour (GH/2073) an Ewe is now in charge of the Eastern Naval Command with its headquarters at Tema. 

With his Area of Operation and Responsibility covering Accra and slightly beyond in the West to Aflao parts of the sea in the East and the Volta Lake, Naval Commodore Moses Beick-Baffour is ready for the December 2016 elections.

The Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie’s Involvement In The ‘Condom’ Camouflage Uniforms Saga

The uniforms, most of which had already been worn, were donated by the Swiss Army to the  expatriate husband of Madam Maud Nongo (Supplier), who is a very good friend of Albert Gaisie. She therefore decided to sell the uniforms to the Fire Service after failed attempts to sell it to the Ghana Armed Forces but finally succeeded with the connivance of her friend Albert Gaisie, who was the then Acting Chief Fire Officer.

The contract document was signed by Albert Gaisie, who was the then Acting Chief Fire Officer and he intentionally did not indicate it in his handing over notes to Brig. Gen. J.B.E. Guyiri, who took over from him.

When the committee was established to investigate the issue, Albert Brown Gaisie, the main culprit was rather left off the hook and members of the Acceptance Board, whom he coerced and threatened to accept the uniforms were interdicted.

The matter was referred to EOCO and the report was made available only to him, all the other officers who were investigated were not given copies of the report. Justice Tsar, who happens to be a member of the EOCO Board and a good friend of Albert Gaisie is very much aware of this issue.

In relation to this, a petition was written by the late DCFO KWAKU OHENE OBIRI, the former Director Legal of GNFS, who died mysteriously in the early part of 2015 after being transferred from the National Headquarters to Volta region then some few months later again transferred to the Upper East Region, all aimed at frustrating  him.

The Facts of the aforesaid subject matter are as follows:

That I was the Director Legal for the Ghana National Fire Service (2009-2013)

That GNFS contracted JILD Ventures to supply 16,339 pairs of camouflage uniforms at a cost of GH₵ 789,663.87 in 2010

That the Ministerial Tender Review Board of the Ministry of Interior approved 16,339 pairs

That adverts in the Ghanaian Times edition of 25^th and 26^thMay, 2010 and the Daily Graphic edition of June, 2010 quoted 16,339 pairs

Opening of tender box at a meeting on 28^th June 2010 quoted 16,339 pairs and the amount quoted was GH₵ 789,663.87.

That the contract agreement between GNFS and JILD ventures was signed by Albert Brown Gaisie, the then Acting Chief Fire Officer quoted 16,339 pieces as the same amount.

That JILD ventures supplied the camouflage uniforms at the central stores James Town Accra and the Acceptance Board conducted an inspection on 15^th June, 2011 at 13:45 hours 

That recommendations of the acceptance board members, who were threatened and compelled by Albert Brown Gaisie, to approve the uniforms are as follows:

That the board accepted all camouflage uniforms supplied by JILD ventures to the Central Stores, though about half of the uniforms were used uniforms.

That all the camouflage uniforms inspected were in good condition.

That there was a disagreement between the parties as to the use of the words PAIRS AND PIECES with series of letters to the sector ministry and vice versa.

That the disagreement meant that the GNFS had to pay double the amount quoted delayed the payment for the camouflage uniforms

That the Plaintiff (JILD ventures) went to court to recover the Price of goods sold, Interest, Damages for Breach of Contract and Cost.

That all these transactions went on without involving me (the Director Legal).

That the order of the court was as follows:

GNFS to pay the principal sum of GH₵ 749,791.62,

Interest from 15^th August,2011 to the date of final payment.

Damages for Breach of Contract GH₵ 5,000.00

Cost GH₵ 5,000.00

The Fast Track High Court Accra, entered judgment against GNFS of the 8^th of June 2012

That an Application for Stay of Execution was put before the  Court on 6^th July 2012 but was refused on 24^th  July, 2013.

That the Application was repeated at the Court of Appeal.

That the Trial High Court proceeded to issue a Garnishee Proceeding against the accounts of GNFS held at the Bank of Ghana and Ghana Commercial Bank – Osu respectively.

That GNFS accordingly filed an application for Judicial Review on 11^thAugust,2012 before the Supreme Court, which quashed and set aside the Garnishee Order absolutely against GNFS account on 24^th January,2013

That the Fast Track High Court Garnishee Order dated 13^th May,2013,ordered the GNFS to pay a total amount of GH₵ 1,264,454.94.

That when the Camouflage uniforms were being distributed to staff, it was detected that;

Some of the uniforms have been used and washed

A great quantity are faded, tatted, patched and some with name tags and pens.

That the Fire Service Council and Management constituted a Board of Enquiry to investigate the matter and the findings are as follows;

That fire volunteers and NYEP Personnel were not employees of the Service but the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie, wanted to procure camouflage uniforms for them even though the Service Personnel lack adequate uniforms.

PNDC Law 229 gives the Service the only responsibility of training Fire volunteers and not to cloth them.

The Ministerial Tender Review Board gave approval for the procurement of 16,339 pairs of Camouflage uniforms and not pieces

That the contract and the notification letters were both prepared by the Albert Brown Gaisie without the involvement of the then Acting Director Logistics.

That the Contract Letter was signed on 1^st December,2010 and per the terms of the contract, the uniforms were to be supplied by 31^st January,2011,but JILD Ventures could not meet the deadline and thus the contract should have been abrogated by the then Acting Chief Fire Officer(Albert Brown Gaisie). He also failed to indicate in his handing over notes to Brigadier J.B.E. Guyiri, that the contract had expired, neither did he brief the Brigadier.

That the contract letter was not dispatched through the Service Central Registry.

That the reference number of the contract letter signed by the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Albert Brown Gaisie is foreign and anonymous to the Service’s Central Registry.

That the Acceptance Board failed to inspect all the camouflage uniforms to determine whether or not they met all the expectations. They did Random Sampling during inspecting and checking and never inspected and checked all items as indicated in their report.

That the Board of Enquiry INDICTED all the members of the Acceptance Board as well as the then Acting Chief Fire Officer at the time, Albert Brown Gaisie.

That the Director Legal was instructed by the GNFS Council Chairman, Alhaji Amadou Sorogho to constitute a Disciplinary Tribunal based on GNFS Disciplinary Regulations -2003  L.I. 1725,to try only the Acceptance Board Members, EXCLUDING- Albert Brown Gaisie.

That whiles the Disciplinary Tribunal was being constituted, the Fire Service Council instructed the then Acting Chief Fire Officer, Brig. Gen. J.B.E. Guyiri, to suspend members of the Acceptance Board without Pay, whilst Albert Brown Gaisie was left unpunished.

That as the Legal Director, I gave my legal opinion to the Acting Chief Fire Officer on the GNFS Council’s decision to suspend the members of the Acceptance Board, which according to L.I. 1725,constitutes a Major Punishment.

That on 24^th December,2013, the GNFS council met and invited me(Director Legal) at 16:30 hours, for my legal opinion and why the delay in constituting the disciplinary tribunal.

That The delay in constituting the tribunal was because the Acting Chief Fire Officer lost the father and travelled to the Upper West Region, the Membership committee was later changed by the Chairman of the GNFS Council and there was the need for clarification for the suspension of the Acceptance Board members.

That my opinion as Director Legal was that the Council should have waited for the tribunal to try the Officers before meting out the suspension, which could amount to Double Jeopardy (Punishing an offender twice for the same offence).

That my submission as Director Legal, did not go down well with the Council especially the Chairman who categorically said that he could no longer work with me.

That immediately after the meeting, the Acting Chief Fire Officer was instructed by the Council to transfer me to the Volta Region as Regional Commander on or about 17:30 hours on 24^th December,2013, to take over from the late DCFO Attobrah who was sick and on admission at the Police Hospital and died later.

That Eight Months after my transfer, I was again transferred from the Volta Region to the Upper East Region, on 18^thSeptember,2014 as the Regional Commander, to take over from DCFO Edwin Blankson who was my junior and had been transferred to Headquarters.

That I strongly suspect someone’s interest is being protected by branding me as an NPP member and getting me out of National Headquarters, since I have all the facts and documents of the said case.

Facts Of The Case

In 2010 the Fire Service invited public tenders for the supply of various items including 16, 339 pairs of camouflage uniforms. The invitation for public tender was carried in the National Dailies in 2010.

Madam Nongo put in a tender and having been declared successful, entered into a formal contract with the GNFS for the supply of the camouflage uniforms.

Upon the delivery of the uniforms, the service took issue with the plaintiff that the contract was for the supply of 16,339 pairs of uniforms. The plaintiff, however, intimated that the formal agreement entered into with the defendant was for the supply of 16,339 pieces of uniforms and not 16,339 pairs as contended by the defendant.

Issues Set For Trial

After the service of the plaintiff’s writ of summons and its accompanying statement of claim on the defendant, an appearance was filed and later a Statement of Defence for and on behalf of the GNFS.

At the application for directions stage, the court adopted issues including, “Whether or not the invitation for tenders by the Defendant was an invitation to treat for the supply of 16,339 pairs of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff to the Defendant’, and whether or not the insertion of the word ‘pieces’ in the contract, dated, 1st December, 2010 was inadvertent and not pursuant to the invitation for tenders by the defendant.”

The court also looked at “whether or not the delivery of 8,373 and 7,757 pieces of camouflage uniforms by the plaintiff was in accordance with the contract of 1st December, 2010.”

Issues Not In Dispute

According to the court, exhibits tendered showed that it was not in dispute, the plaintiff put in a tender to supply 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms from Switzerland at a price of GH¢48.33 a piece at a total cost of GH¢789,663.87.

It is also not in dispute that the GNFS, on November 25, 2010 addressed the plaintiff through a letter titled “Notification of Award: Supply of Camouflage Uniforms.

In the amount of GH¢789,663.87 in accordance with the instructions to Tenderers as hereby accepted.”

Analysis

The court said that some of the exhibits of the defendants had requested the plaintiff to furnish the GNFS with a Performance Bond “within 14 days of the receipt of Notification of Award of the Contract,” adding “as a result the plaintiff furnished a Performance Bond exhibit ‘E’ herein which she procured from Phoenix Insurance. Exhibit ‘E’ was dated 29^thNovember, 2010.”

“I find that by exhibit ‘F’ dated the 1^stday of December, 2010, the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “Supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms,” adding “there is evidence to the effect that after the execution of the contract, the plaintiff obtained a loan from the Bank and imported the camouflage uniforms.”

“I find from exhibit ‘2’ that the actual quantity of camouflage uniforms supplied by the plaintiff was 16,130 pieces comprising 8373 trousers and 7757 jackets. This finding is supported also by the plaintiff’s answer in admission during cross examination. Nevertheless, an inspection team formed by the defendant accepted the goods supplied by the plaintiff herein and wrote an acceptance report dated 7^thJuly, 2011 received in evidence.”

The court said it found that after the supply of the uniforms, the defendant paired them by way of one trouser to one jacket as a result of which 7757 pairs were generated leaving 616 excess trousers, adding that “these excess trousers of 616 were rejected by the defendant who then wrote exhibit ‘K’ a letter dated the 7th day of July, 2011 in which the defendant requested the plaintiff to submit fresh invoices for “7,757 full sets of camouflage uniforms or 15,514 pieces at a rate of GH¢48,33 per piece. Exhibit ‘K’ also requested the plaintiff to ‘take back the 616 pieces of trousers still in the possession of the defendant.”

The court said that there was evidence on record that despite directives from the Sector Minister that the GNFS pays for 15,514 pieces of uniforms as a result of which some exhibits were requested and furnished, the defendant was still unwilling to pay the plaintiff the cost as directed.

“The plaintiff’s lawyer, therefore, wrote to the Minister a letter dated the 22nd August, 2011 pointing out the fact of non-compliance with the Minister’s directives by the defendant.”

“The court finds that the defendant’s unwillingness to pay for the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had accepted arose from various correspondences between it and the Ministry for Interior.”

Fire Service Council

Justice Kwame Asiedu said that the court found the evidence on record that the Fire Service Council played a major role in the non-payment of the plaintiff for the goods which she supplied and were accepted by the defendant saying “there is evidence that the Fire Service Council met on the 13^th July, 2011.”

“In the opinion of the court the Fire Service Council fell into a grievous error when it stated, without recourse to the contract document, that “naturally uniforms are worn in pairs,” adding, “The court can take judicial notice of the fact that whether apparel can pass for ‘uniform’ depends on the organisation concerned.”

Pieces vrs Pairs

The court found that evidence adduce at the trial was that it was not entirely correct as stated by the Fire Service Council that uniforms are worn in pairs, adding “the defendant did not contract with the plaintiff for the supply of what are ‘worn in pairs’. Rather the contract evidenced by exhibit ‘F’ was for the supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms.”

“Even in the Fire Service, uniform is not necessarily a reference to a particular shirt and trouser but it includes the cup and the boots as well as the socks and the belt and many others apparels on the dress worn sometimes with reference to the rank of the officer in question.”

Justice Asiedu held that per the evidence adduced, the invitation for tender published in the various newspapers was not part of the contract documents, adding “hence it was wrongful for the Fire Service Council to rely on the invitation to treat as constituting a contract and then say that uniforms are naturally worn in pairs.”

“Worse still in the 21st century, where the law is held supreme, it sounds oppressive and totalitarian for the Fire Service Council to conclude as it did that: ‘Should this arrangement not be acceptable to the supplier then the entire consignment delivered by the supplier should be rejected’.”

“Within the context of exhibit “F” the contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendant herein, the word ‘piece’ as used in the phrase ‘supply of 16,339 pieces of camouflage uniforms’ in my view, therefore, cannot be interpreted to read ‘pairs’.”

“That will surely amount to re-writing the contract for the parties. In my opinion given the context in which ‘piece’ has been used in the contract between the parties, the most appropriate meaning is that which connotes singleness or a unit of. Hence, the phrase “16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms” will imply “16,339 units of camouflage uniforms or units of camouflage uniforms which adds up to 16, 339,” the judge held.

The court held that the GNFS contracted with the plaintiff to supply parts of or sections of or individual items or units of uniforms that sums up in total to 16, 339, adding that “in the view of the court it will be unconscionable for the defendant to contract with the plaintiff to supply 16, 339 pieces of uniforms at GH¢48. 33 per piece and then when it comes to paying for the commodity for the defendant to turn round to say a ‘piece’ means ‘pairs’ to enable the defendant take two pieces for the price of one piece contrary to the agreement as shown in the contract exhibit ‘F’.”

“The plaintiff put in a tender for the supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. Subsequently, the defendant, on 25th November, 2010 wrote a ‘notification of award – supply of camouflage uniforms’ to the plaintiff evidenced by exhibit ‘D’. Here again, the defendant indicated to the plaintiff that she was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. Then on the 1st December, 2010 the defendant executed a formal contract with the plaintiff for the “supply of 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms”.

In my opinion the GNFS has exhibited all the outward signs of agreement that the plaintiff was to supply 16, 339 pieces of camouflage uniforms. I hold that the defendant is bound by the contract to which it had manifestly and voluntarily expressed its assent even if its actual intentions were different.”

The judge said that if the GNFS had in fact made a mistake by its inability to express its intentions clearly on the contract document by stating ‘16,339 pieces’ instead of ‘16,339 pairs’, the plaintiff should not be the one to suffer for it, holding that “the defendant must bear the brunt and the consequences of its own mistake. I hold, therefore, that the defendant – Ghana National Fire Service is bound to pay for all the goods supplied by the plaintiff which it had by exhibit ‘H’ accepted.”

The court also acknowledged that the plaintiff agreed to take back six hundred and sixteen (616) pieces of the trousers supplied and ruled that “the defendant is, therefore, liable to the plaintiff for the cost of the remainder of the goods totalling 15,514 pieces at GH¢48.33 which sums up to GH¢749,791.62.”

In the end, the court had entered an amount of GH¢749,791.62 as judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant and also held that the plaintiff was also entitled to recover interest in view of the delay in the payment by the defendant.

Costs of GH¢5,000.00 was also awarded against the defendant.

The GNFS was represented in court by DOIII Emmanuel Jiaggey with Cecil Adadevor supported by Tricia Quartey as counsel for the GNFS while Ken Anku, holding the brief of Acquah Sampson, represented the plaintiff on judgement day which was August 8, 2012.

Source: Eagle-Eyed Vigilante Group